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ABSTRACT
The side-channel attack is an attack method based on the informa-
tion gained about implementations of computer systems, rather
than weaknesses in algorithms. Information about system charac-
teristics such as power consumption, electromagnetic leaks and
sound can be exploited by the side-channel attack to compromise
the system. Much research effort has been directed towards this
field. However, such an attack still requires strong skills, thus can
only be performed effectively by experts. Here, we propose SCNet,
which automatically performs side-channel attacks. And we also
design this network combining with side-channel domain knowl-
edge and different deep learning model to improve the performance
and better to explain the result. The results show that our model
achieves good performance with fewer parameters. The proposed
model is a useful tool for automatically testing the robustness of
computer systems.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Side-channel analysis and counter-
measures; Cryptanalysis and other attacks; •Computingmethod-
ologies→ Artificial intelligence.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Deep learning models have been used in many areas, such as im-
age classification [9, 25], object detection [16], and natural lan-
guage processing (NLP) [7, 26]. While deep learning has made
huge improvements on computer vision (CV) and NLP, using deep
learning to perform security-related tasks is also catching people’s
attention. Recently, researchers pay more attention to performing
cryptanalysis using neural networks, especially side-channel at-
tacks [17, 20, 28]. We notice that Maghrebi et. al [17] have already
compared a lot of machine learning models, such as random forest,
support vector machine, convolutional neural network and recur-
rent neural network. But they evaluate them on DPA_v2 [6] with
very simple structure, which is hard to realize the full potential of
neural networks. More than that, they do not design a model for
side-channel attack specially.
The side-channel attack (SCA) based on power consumption [3,
14, 18] is a powerful attack method. It takes advantage of infor-
mation obtained by the implementation of the security algorithms
(i.e. varying power consumption when the circuit runs different
operations) in order to obtain part of the secret information. One of
the common targets of SCA is the key used in a block cipher [12].
A block cipher consists of an encryption algorithm E(x ,k) and a de-
cryption algorithmD(y,k), where x is the plaintext to be encrypted,
k is the key, and y is the ciphertext. They are all binary strings with
fixed lengths. Generally x = D(y,k) and y = E(x ,k). For example
in AES-128 [12], x ,y,k have same length 128 bits, i.e. 16 bytes.
To obtain the key k fixed in a block cipher running on a cipher
chip, here we discuss two main threat models in side-channel
attacks based on the power of the attackers: a) The attackers can
encrypt any messages they want by any key to sample the leaked
information (i.e. power consumption) from the attacked chip. So
they can analyze power traces by building a power consumption
template [3, 22] on this chip; and b) The attackers can only encrypt
messages by specific key fixed in the attacked chip. So they need to
use a same type of chip as a template one to encrypt any messages
they want by any key to obtain the leaked information. And they
build a consumption model based on known information from the
template chip to predict the key fixed in the attacked chip. All these
two threat models, the attackers build a reference model based on
data from different sources.
In this paper, we propose a novel approach under threat model a)
to analyze power consumption information (i.e. voltages shown in
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Figure 1: The traces are the voltage fluctuations of the cipher
chips during the encryption. The side-channel attack mod-
els take these as input, and recovers the keys without the
intermediate of domain expert.
Figure 1) to attack block ciphers. Here, sampling points refer to
the voltages sampled from the cipher chip at any given time during
the encryption. The sequence of sampling points is called the trace.
Figure 1 gives an example of traces which encrypt the same plain-
text with different keys. Usually, many sampling points describe one
same operation used in block ciphers together. We refer to leakage
hidden in these points the crossing information, which is similar
to the result of the high order differential power attack(HO-DPA)
function [13, 14] which combines multiple sampling points from
one trace. The HO-DPA function can be explained as a function
combining multiple points using operations like adding, subtracting
and multiplying. But crossing information is made by multiplying
self-adaptation weights to a group of sampling points and then
applying an HO-DPA function on them. It is difficult to distinguish
which group of sample points contains the leaked information of
the secret key when the block cipher equips with a defense strategy.
In order to solve this problem, we propose the sampling point
embedding technique, which can automatically transfer each sam-
pling point into a vector having a fixed length to encode the leaked
information behind the point. We further propose a new deep learn-
ing model, called SCNet, to automatically perform side-channel
attacks with good performance. In SCNet, we propose a dilated
encoder block to generate embedding vectors for sampling points.
It can obtain much more diverse features and avoid over-fitting on
some sensitive noise points. At the end of the block, we stack fea-
tures from each encoder in this block as a whole one. The model can
learn how to generate correct embedding vectors in an end-to-end
fashion.
In Figure 2, we show a system architecture of predicting the
secret key byte by using SCNet. A block cipher algorithm is run-
ning in a chip which attackers can input keys and plaintexts and
receive ciphertexts, i.e. threat model a) we have introduced. Attack-
ers sample the voltage signals by using a resistor when encrypting
messages and choose the sampling points related with the attacked
key byte to input to the model, which are called points of interest.
Then, the model automatically transfer each sampling point into
embedding vector and calculate crossing information which is used
to predict the probability of key byte.
Chip With Block 
Cipher
A part of voltage signal sequence during the encryption 
SCNet
Plaintext Key
Ciphertext
Probability of Key Byte
Figure 2: An overview of automated side-channel attack by
using SCNet. Only the points of interest are kept in each volt-
age signal sequence (i.e. trace).
The commonly used evaluation method of SCA is based on the
success rate (SR) and guessing entropy (GE) [23], representing
whether the model predicts the right label and the average remain-
ing workload to predict the right one, respectively. The idea is
to find the SR and GE expectations under multiple power traces
through multiple attack experiments. In our experiments, we use
this metrics to evaluate our model and others. Mostly, we compare
SCNet with ASCADCNNmodel [21]. According to the result shown
in [21], ASCAD CNN has better performance than template attack,
VGG-16 and MLP. In addition, we compare SCNet with SCNet_seq,
which employs all the components in SCNet but is built in a sequen-
tial manner, i.e. without dilated blocks. In practice, we also need to
consider the time complexity and storage space complexity of the
attack method. Approaches that require less training and predicting
data are also considered superior. Thus, we evaluate the models
in terms of time consumption, model size, and number of traces
required for prediction. More than that, we prefer to introduce a
new view to explain how neural network can help us solve this
question.
In summary, our contributions in this paper are as follows:
(1) We propose SCNet. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first
time to explain the reason why we can use deep learning
models to help us analyze side-channel traces. And it is
designed for side-channel attacks specially, so it is more
powerful to attack block ciphers with defense.
(2) We design dilated encoder blocks and sampling point em-
bedding techniques to accurately obtain the crossing infor-
mation between sampling points and the secret key.
(3) Extensive experimental evaluations using real-world public
datasets including ASCAD [21] and DPA_v4.2 [1] demon-
strate that our approach is reasonable for building the at-
tacking model.
The rest of this paper are organized as follows. Section 2 re-
views related works in areas concerning techniques involved in
the proposed approach. Section 3 introduces how we assume the
properties of the sampling points and propose a new method to
analyze the points based on their properties. Section 4 discusses the
details of the proposed SCNet. Section 5 introduces the experiment
settings and interprets the experimental evaluation results. Finally,
in Section 6, we conclude the paper and discuss potential future
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research directions. And you can find our models and dataset from
https://github.com/GuanlinLee/SCNet.
2 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we review related work in areas concerning tech-
niques involved in the proposed approach.
2.1 Side-Channel Attacking Technologies
2.1.1 Differential Power Analysis (DPA). DPA measures power lev-
els at different parts of the cipher chip and applies statistical analysis
to overcome countermeasures, such as added noise, that are applied
to obscure individual bits [13, 14]. Specific operating information
can be obtained by DPA to recover the secret key. Firstly, the at-
tacker obtains many encryption traces about different plaintexts
at random. Some of the traces are related with one specific bit,
which is label 0; while others are related with label 1 of this bit. The
positions having huge difference between 0’s traces and 1’s traces
are the most related to the secret information. Then, the attacker
can guess some values of the secret key and find the most related
one.
2.1.2 Correlation Power Analysis (CPA). CPA was proposed by [2].
To predict the secret key, the adversary needs to model the leaking
information. Usually, the adversary analyzes the correlation be-
tween a distribution t of sampling points and a distribution HW (y)
of the HammingWeight of the intermediate results of cryptography
by using:
C(t ,y) = E[t ∗ HW (y)] − E[t]E[HW (y)]√
Var [t]Var [HW (y)]
.
By analyzing C(t ,y), the adversary can find the most related inter-
mediate results to obtain the secret key. Firstly, we need to measure
the actual power consumption of the chip when it encrypts mul-
tiple different plaintexts. Then, we calculate power consumption
which we guess is true according to the power leakage model [19].
Finally, in order to restore the secret key, we analyze the correlation
between the two kinds of power consumption.
2.1.3 Template Attack. Template attack is a powerful type of side-
channel attack. In order to implement a template attack, the attacker
first needs to create templates of different secret keys [22] by finding
a set of functions to fit the collected traces with different keys. It is
common for an attacker to analyze a same device as the one being
attacked. By modeling and analyzing the templates, the traces of
the attacked device are further compared, and the key information
can be obtained by using maximum likelihood analysis.
2.1.4 ASCAD. Prouff et al. [21] proposed the ASCAD dataset,
which is a public side-channel attack dataset. In this dataset, SCA
is implemented by the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [12].
A mask is employed to lower the correlation between the power
consumption and the intermediate value of the algorithm by ran-
domizing certain values in the AES program. The traces of masked
AES in the dataset are synchronized, and no specific hardware coun-
termeasure is activated on the ATMega8515. Only the 700 points
of interest are kept in each trace. There are 50,000 traces in the
train set and 10,000 traces in the testing set. They propose to use
AlexNet to perform key recovery with the 2-D convolution replaced
by a 1-D convolution. They compared their model with a baseline
neural network (e.g. vanilla NN) and conventional methods. The
results show that CNNs are much better than NNs and conventional
methods.
2.2 Deep Learning Technologies
2.2.1 Neural Network. Neural network(NN) is models composed
of neural units. Units are separated into many groups. Each group
corresponds to a layer. NN may have hundreds of layers in a model,
which includes millions of units in it. After each layer there is an
non-linear activation function, e.g., Sigmoid, Tanh, ReLU [5], which
introduce more non-linear characteristic to the model.
Sigmoid(x) = 11 + exp (−x)
Tanh(x) = exp (x) − exp (−x)exp (x) + exp (−x)
ReLU(x) =max(x , 0)
To train a NN having ability to achieve special task, we need a
dataset named train set. And to validate the generalization of other
datasets, we also need a valid set and a test set. During the training
process, we feed the network with input data from train set to
calculate the output. And the label from train set and the output are
sent to the loss function which is used to obtain a objective value.
Then a process named backward propagation [15] starts to compute
the gradients of the units layer by layer and use the gradients to
update each unit’s value. After training, the network would have a
good performance on both valid set and test set.
2.2.2 Dilated Convolutions. The main application of the dilated
convolution is the density prediction: computer vision applications
where the projected object has a similar size and structure to the
input image [27]. The filters of dilated convolution are similar to the
ones in ordinary convolution, while they skip some points during
convolution, which directly lead to the increase of the receptive field.
In implementations, it can also decrease the number of parameters
ensuring that the model has much lower over-fitting risk. By using
dilated convolution, the convolutional layer can capture farther
spatial information and richer semantic information.
2.2.3 Long Short Term Memory (LSTM). LSTM is a kind of the
recurrent neural network (RNN), which is usually used to handle
sequential data. A standard LSTM unit is called a cell, which has
an input gate, an output gate, and a forget gate [10]. The cell re-
members values over arbitrary time intervals and the three gates
regulate the flow of data into and out of the cell, which can reduce
the influence of gradient vanishing. LSTM is currently widely used
in text translation, speech synthesis, and other fields. With the
deepening of the research, there are various versions of LSTM, such
as GRU [4] and Bidirectional LSTM [8].
3 ATTACKING ASSUMPTIONS
In this section, we introduce some assumptions of the traces, i.e.
sampling point sequences. In [14], a DPA test can be summarized
as follows: let T[1, ...,m][1, . . . ,k] denote m traces, which consist
of k sampling points. Let Tc [i] denote the i-th point within the
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trace Tc . Let C[1, ...,m] denotem known inputs or outputs for the
traces with Cc corresponding to Tc . Let B(Cc ,Kn ) denote a binary
valued selection function with input Cc and Kn as the guessed key
byte. Each point i in the differential trace ∆Bi for the guess Kn is
computed as follows:
∆Bi =
∑m
c=1 B(Cc ,Kn )Tc [i]∑m
c=1 B(Cc ,Kn )
−
∑m
c=1(1 − B(Cc ,Kn ))Tc [i]∑m
c=1(1 − B(Cc ,Kn ))
.
We use the traditional methods to guide us to analyze the traces,
but using a neural network.
3.1 Waveform Resolving
Suppose that the traces comprise of various kinds of operating
information, such as XOR and S-Box( i.e. a nonlinear transform) [12],
which satisfies:
xi =
p−1∑
j=0
N−1∑
l=0
xi, j,l +
p−1∑
l=0
εi,l ,
xi, j = [xi, j,0,xi, j,1, . . . ,xi, j,N−1],
εi = [εi,0, εi,1, . . . , εi,p−1],
where xi, j represents the j-th operating information concerning
the i-th sampling point, and xi, j is an N -dimensional vector. p is
the number of different operations. εi is an p-dimensional noise
vector. For every sampling point, there is a noise feature for each
operation vector. xi is a direct representation for the information
carried by the i-th sampling point.
For the aligned sub-traces X , X ′ from two different traces, the
sampling points at the same coordinate are related to the encrypting
bits. That is to say when the operating bits, i.e. the intermediate
results in the block cipher, are the same, the difference between the
two sub-traces should only be the noise distribution:
X [a,b] = [xa ,xa+1,xa+2, . . . ,xb ],
X ′[a,b] = [x ′a ,x ′a+1,x ′a+2, . . . ,x ′b ],
∀ (xi − εi ), (x ′i − ε ′i ) ∈
opseti,k , for the same intermediate results in the block cipher, xi−
x ′i ∼ (εi − ε ′i ),
where opset i,k denotes a set of the k-th (k ≤ p) available opera-
tion at position i . It is assumed that every sampling point can be
represented by an N -dimensional vector.
3.2 Waveform noise model
In template attacks [22], the multivariate Gaussian distribution is
proposed to model the noise. However, here we choose to use the
Wiener process to model noise to leverage temporal information.
For each dimension in the p-dimensional vector, we assume that the
noise is sampled from a same Wiener process. The Wiener process
in each dimension is independent and identical:
εi,h (t) − εi,h (s) ∼ N
(
0,σh2(t−s)
)
,
for t > s > 0, h ≤ p − 1.
More than that, the noise distribution between sampling points
from any two different sub-traces is:
∀ (xi − εi ), (x ′i − ε ′i ) ∈ opset i,k , for the same
intermediate results in the block cipher, xi − x ′i
∼ N (µ0, µ1, µ2, . . . , µp−1;σ 20 ,σ 21 ,σ 22 , . . . ,σ 2p−1).
4 SCNET
To obtain the crossing information automatically, we design an
encoder group and stack those having different hyperparameters to
build an encoding block, which is powerful enough to extract the
crossing information hidden in the traces. And the model has the
capability to project the sampling points to multi-scale embedding
information through the encoders. The embedding vectors between
different sampling points in same trace usually are various, because
at different times the chip may perform a different operation or just
wait for the next operation. Moreover, the waveforms of different
traces vary with the plaintexts and keys. When we fix the plaintext
and key, the waveform is only related to noise corresponding to the
chip. So the distribution of them is Ptrace (X |plaintext ,key,noise).
In addition, the distribution of sampling points in the traces is
Ppoint (xi |X , i). And our model estimates a distribution:
P(keybyte |X ) = P(labels |x0,x1,x2, . . . ,xM−1),
whereX is a trace consisted of sampling points x0,x1,x2, . . . ,xM−1,
and keybyte is part of the key (one byte) used to produce these
points. To train the model, we adopt the multi-class cross-entropy
function as the loss function:
Loss = − 1
BatchSize
BatchSize−1∑
v=0
255∑
z=0
(
yv,z log
(
y′v,z
) )
since there are 256 (28) labels for each key byte.
In practice, one way to obtain the crossing information is to
utilize fully connected layers. Another way is to skip some points
by using dilated encoder. Both methods have their advantages and
disadvantages. The first method can completely obtain the infor-
mation we need. However, too many parameters make the network
prone to over-fitting on noise signal. The second method avoids us-
ing too many parameters. However, the dilated encoder may avoid
too many crucial points, which makes it fail to predict the key. But
in order to follow the conventional methods, we decided to adopt
the dilated encoder. And using a group of dilated encoders together
can make sure that all crucial points will make contribution to the
final output.
As we mentioned, a group of dilated encoders is used to build a
encoder block. For a dilated encoder, it can bypass some values and
encode the rest. But it will be very unstable if we use a hyperparam-
eter to decide which values to ignore according to their positions or
features. It is much better to use convolution layers to calculate the
crossing information, because the sliding window will obtain all
combination situations if there are enough layers. To bypass some
values, we can pad some zeros on filters. We obtain the i-th output
after performing an r -dilated encoding operation on the input X
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Figure 3: The structure of SCNet. D-CONV1D is the one-dimensional dilated convolutional layer. BN is the batch norm
layer [11]. AVGPooling is the average pooling layer. LSTM is the LSTM layer. FC is the fully connected layer.
with l-size kernel f :
output i =
l−1∑
k=0
xi+rk ∗ fk ,
where ∗ is the convolution operator.
According to the propertymentioned in Section 3.2 of theWiener
process [24], we can use LSTM to denoise signal vectors. The struc-
ture of SCNet is shown in Figure 3. In SCNet, we incorporate six
similar dilated encoder groups into each block to resolve sampling
points at the same time. The LSTM layers reduce the number of
feature maps after each block and ensure that the output channels
are fewer than the feature maps of the next block to forget most of
the duplicate and useless features.
5 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We conduct experiments based on real-world datasets to evaluate
the performance of the proposed SCNet and compare with others.
5.1 Datasets
We use ASCAD dataset, which is a public side-channel dataset, to
test the models. This dataset contains 50,000 items( i.e. traces) for
training, which we split into the train set and the validation set;
and another 10,000 items for testing. Each item has exactly 700
sampling points. All traces are generated by using different keys.
The datasets has three versions with different offsets, which means
these traces are not aligned and with most 0, 50 and 100 points de-
viation, respectively: 1) ASCAD Desync0, 2) ASCAD Desync50 and
3) ASCAD Desync100. It is suitable for evaluating the performance
of models under complex conditions.
We also use DPA_v4.2 [1] to test the models. We split the raw
DPA_v4.2 dataset into two parts. The first part contains 75,000 items
for training, which we split into the train set and the validation
set. The second part contains 5,000 items for testing. Each item has
exactly 500 sampling points which are related to the 11-th byte of
the AES secret key. In the train set, the items are generated by using
15 different keys. In the testing set, all the traces are generated by
using a same key. Both of the datasets are acquired by the software
implementing the AES algorithm with a mask.
5.2 Comparison Models
Since we evaluate our model on ASCAD as a main result, it is nec-
essary to compare with a well designed and trained neural network
as well as a traditional template attack. Thus, we adopt the ASCAD
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Figure 4: The structure of SCNet_seq. The model is built in a sequential manner with the same components as in SCNet.
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Figure 5: Ablation study on DPA_v4.2 dataset.
Model Name Sliding Windows Size Dilation Rate LSTM Dimension Feature Maps
SCNet [7;7;7] [15,13,11;9,7,5;5,2,1] [16;64;256] [8;32;92]
SCNet_seq [11;11;9] [13,11,9;13,11,9;13,11,9] [64;128;512] [32,48,64;96,112,128;192,224,256]
Table 1: The Hyperparameters of SCNet_seq and SCNet
CNN as the comparison model, in order to illustrate the effects of
our design choices. Another baseline model is SCNet_seq, which is
showed in Figure 4. It employs all the components in SCNet, but
the whole model is built in a sequential manner. It has less dilated
encoders and wider LSTM layers than SCNet. Additionally, to test
the effect of LSTM layers, we compare SCNet with 6Group and
3Group. 6Group has the same block structure as SCNet, but does
not contain any LSTM layer. 3Group reduces the number of dilated
encoder groups in each block by 50%, and with no LSTM layer. The
parameters of SCNet and SCNet_seq are shown in Table 1.
5.3 Ablation Study
To validate the effectiveness of SCNet, we perform ablation experi-
ments on DPA_v4.2 dataset. In all experiments, we use the same
SCNet: A Neural Network for Automated Side-Channel Attack Woodstock ’18, June 03–05, 2018, Woodstock, NY
ASCAD CNN SCNet_seq SCNet 6Group 3Group Template Attack
Training Time (sec) 14,250 1,000 1,675 816 510 -
Model Size (MB) 508.0 26.5 16.6 36.0 16.7 -
ASCAD Desync0 Required 150 80 160 None None 190[21]
ASCAD Desync50 Required 4,570 1,970 530 None 4270 3200[21]
ASCAD Desync100 Required None 2,760 3,700 None None None[21]
DPA_v4.2 Required None 1,690 1,200 4760 3,200 10
Table 2: A comparison between models and traditional method template attack. The models are trained on GTX TITAN X.
"XXX Required" is the minimum number of traces for dataset "XXX", which are required to get 100%-correct forecast. "None"
means that the model cannot get 100%-correct forecast within 5000 traces. [23]
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Figure 6: Different model’s performance on the ASCAD dataset.
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Figure 7: The performance of differentmodels on DPA_v4.2.
optimization hyperparameters and split the train data into the train
set and the validation set with same random seed. In order to limit
the size of model and computational complexity as well as prevent
over-fitting, we use 3 encoder blocks in the network at most. In
each block, there are 6 dilated encoder groups at most. In each
group, there are three convolution layers.
More specifically, we evaluate networks using the same sliding
windows size and dilation rate without the LSTM layers at first.
The experiments study the effect of different number of dilated
encoder groups in each block, as shown in Figure 5a. “rank” is
the position where the correct byte appears in the output, which
is sorted in descending order of the probability [23]. The smallest
number of traces that can reach rank 0 is the only metric in our
experiments. The best result of the network without using LSTM
layers is achieved by the network with three dilated encoder groups.
Evenwe use same number of encoder groups, the onewithout LSTM
layers can not beat the SCNet. And it is clear that without LSTM
layers, the prediction curves do not decline as smoothly as the one
of SCNet. This means that it is hard for the models to decrease the
guess entropy by using more traces, directly. The LSTM layers can
make sure that the model predicts unchanging distribution so that
when predicting on more traces, it achieves better results.
Then, we evaluate networks with three LSTM layers. The exper-
iments study the effect of the number of dilated encoder groups
in each block, as shown in Figure 5b. The results achieved by the
networks with between 2 to 4 groups are not good. SCNet, which
uses 6 groups in each block, achieves the best result. For networks
with less groups in each block, the crossing information hidden
behind the traces is hard to exact. And the lowest rank appears in
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each predict curve is related with the number of groups. The more
groups are used, the less traces are needed to achieve the lowest
point. However the lowest point is not related with the number of
groups. And the model needs more groups to obtain the crossing
information we need to predict the distribution.
Finally, we evaluate networks which have the same number of
dilated encoder groups in each block. The experiments study the
effect of different numbers of LSTM layers. The results are shown in
Figure 5c. For networks with less LSTM layers, it is hard to denoise
the traces. And the lowest rank appears in each predict curve is
related with the number of LSTM layers, which is quite similar with
the relation of the number of groups. The more LSTM layers are
used, the less traces are needed to achieve the lowest point. However
the model without any LSTM layer has better result than the one
with one or two LSTM layers. When the model is equipped with
not enough LSTM layers, the quailty of the prediction distribution
is not as good as the one without LSTM layers. And the model
needs as much as possible LSTM layers to guarantee that the noise
is denoised.
5.4 Results
We perform extensive experiments comparing the ASCAD CNN,
template attack and our proposed models. Table 2 shows a detailed
comparison between them. SCNet_seq and SCNet have fewer pa-
rameters than ASCAD CNN (26.5MB and 16.6MB vs 508.0MB
with an almost 95% reduction) and are faster in terms of training
(1,000s and 1,675s vs 14,250s with an almost 90% reduction). To
compare the results, we use the same test code which is provided
by [21]. Both of two models achieve significantly better perfor-
mance than ASCAD CNN even template attack. For the ASCAD
Desync0 dataset, which is an aligned dataset, our two networks
only need to use around a hundred traces(80 or 160) to obtain
the key byte. More traces(1,970 or 530) are needed for the AS-
CAD Desync50 dataset, which is a lightly unaligned dataset. Even
more traces(2,760 or 3,700) are needed for the ASCAD Desync100
dataset, which is a heavily unaligned dataset. For the DPA_v4.2
dataset, which is an aligned dataset, around one thousand traces
are needed(1,690 or 1,200).
To increase the credibility of the results, we also compare SCNet
with 6Group and 3Group. And the results shows that the SCNet has
better performance on all datasets. The 6Group and the 3Group can
only achieve relatively good results on DPA_v4.2. And on ASCAD,
all three sub-datasets are extremely challenging for the 6Group and
the 3Group.
Figures 6a, 6b, 6c show the performance of SCNet_seq, SCNet
and ASCAD CNN on the three ASCAD datasets, respectively. In
Figure 6a, there is no significant difference between the number
of traces the three models use to predict the key correctly. All
curves are very smooth without large fluctuations. However, the
biggest value of guessing entropy achieved by SCNet is lower than
those of the other two approaches. In Figure 6b, SCNet achieves
significantly better results than the others. And the curve of ASCAD
CNN repeatedly rises and falls sharply between 300 traces and
1,500 traces. Between 1500 traces and 4,000 traces, it has a small
change. In Figure 6c, SCNet_seq is better than SCNet and ASCAD
CNN. The ASCAD CNN is the worst one, which can not reduce
the guessing entropy to 0 in 5,000 traces. Although the ASCAD
CNN curve declines, it remains within a relatively stable range
finally. And the one of SCNet falls quickly at first, but it rises to a
very high value and falls again. After fluctuating within a certain
range, it reduces to 0 when using 3,700 traces and stays at 0. The
SCNet_seq outperforms others on this dataset. The curves of it
falls quickly to 0 after using 2760 traces which is about 1,000 traces
less than SCNet and stays at 0 stably. In Figure 7, we only show
results of SCNet_seq and SCNet, while the ASCAD CNN cannot
provide the correct prediction after training. The SCNet achieves
better result than SCNet_seq. The curve of SCNet shows that the
guessing entropy at start is very low and it falls to 0 quickly after
using 1,200 traces and does not rise again. But the SCNet_seq one is
very unstable at first. It starts at a higher point and falls firstly but
then rises up very fast. After rising to the highest point, it falls to 0
slowly. Finally, it stays at 0 after using 1,690 traces. Additionally, it
is much easier to train models on datasets with smaller offsets, as
expected.
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we propose SCNet. It takes the sampling point se-
quences as the input and obtains the key byte, which is used in
the block cipher algorithms. To obtain the key byte, SCNet adopts
dilated encoders and sampling point embedding vectors to capture
the cross information (high order relationship). Extensive experi-
ments on the ASCAD and the DPA_v4.2 datasets show that SCNet
can restore key bytes with significantly fewer traces than ASCAD
CNN. The outcomes from this research is very useful for both attack
and defense in block cipher security.
And in the future, our model may could be used to obtain the
data running in GPUs when people train other models. This is a
huge threat for those sensitive information and privacy. In future
research, we will study how to adapt SCNet to compromise the secu-
rity of today’s federated machine learning (FML) systems, thereby
finding ways to improve their robustness.
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